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Recognising that aid effectiveness critically depends upon the quality of host country 
institutions and policies, international aid agencies have sought to inform their activities 
through more systematic political economy analysis (PEA). Three analytical frameworks for 
PEA are compared, contrasted and critically appraised in the light reflections of PEA 
practitioners and recent theoretical debate about development management. We conclude that 
the potential of PEA to improve development effectiveness depends on how far it addresses the 
micro as well as macro politics of aid, and permits a finer grained engagement between 
analysis and action. This requires more reflexivity on the part of those who commission and 
produce PEA, and further movement from intervention to interaction modalities for aid 
delivery.  
 
Key words: political economy analysis; development management; aid effectiveness; 
complexity. 
 
1. Introduction 
Aid effectiveness, from a traditional Northern donor perspective, hinges on finding 
development partners who are both ‘committed’ to common goals and ‘capable’ of 
absorbing extra resources to help achieve them: see DFID’s 2011 review of its entire 
bilateral and multilateral partnership portfolio, for example. But such assessment is 
severely complicated by the difficulty of measuring both concepts, and by their 
variation within agencies and over time, not least because of their mutual 
interdependence (Waterman and Meier, 1998). This paper explores an alternative 
perspective on aid effectiveness as both a highly complex problem, and one that is 
deeply and unavoidably political (e.g. see Killick, 2004; Hyden, 2008; Hayman, 2009; 
Booth, 2011). It does so by exploring how, and how well, donor activities are 
informed by effective political economy analysis (PEA).  
The outcome document from the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, that took place in Busan at the end of 2011, makes no explicit mention 
of PEA, but it does implicitly highlight both its importance and complexity. External 
aid should sustain “democratic ownership” within recipient countries – by affirming 
the role of national parliaments and local government, for example. Traditional and 
non-traditional aid donors should also foster “inclusive relationships” among 
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themselves; respond to rights-based approaches promoted by civil society 
organisations and build links with the private sector. They should facilitate “joint 
risk management” and be transparent about what they spend and how. Target 
setting and results orientation should be complemented by more open processes of 
consultation, including those aimed at  building partnerships between donors and 
national recipients over assessment, sequencing and evaluation of institutional and 
policy change (FHLFAE, 2011).  
Current donor frameworks for PEA have evolved without much, if any, 
reference to a concurrent revival of academic interest in development management 
theory (DMT), despite overlapping emphasis on power, stakeholder incentives and 
implications for aid effectiveness. Like PEA, the origins of DMT are old and diffuse. 
Its recent revival centres on a schism between the extensive literature on 
management as a planned, rational and above all controlled process, and a 
contrarian view that regards such “managerialism” as anathema to a political view of 
development as liberation or empowerment (Gulrajani, 2010). Gulrajani sets out to 
identify scope for planned management of human development that can overcome 
this dilemma. She calls such activity “romantic management” in recognition that it is 
likely to depart from at least some of the Western Enlightenment assumptions that 
underpin dominant development management thinking, such as the idea that there 
is one universal ‘best-practice’ framework for PEA that exists independently of who 
uses it, and in what context.1 In re-examining PEA as a management tool we broaden 
its focus from aid recipient countries to include the diverse range of donors 
collaborating with them, and explore how far the use and utility of such analysis can 
also be broadened. 
                                               
1 In a subsequent paper Gulrajani (2011) also refers to “romantic” as “radical-reformist”. We opt for 
the former term on the grounds that it echoes a distinct tradition in the social sciences, as recently 
explored by Bronk (2009). 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
PEA and of ongoing debate over its strengths and weaknesses as an aid to 
development effectiveness. Section 3 examines this literature from a wider 
perspective by drawing on the DMT literature.  Section 4 turns the analytical 
spotlight on development agencies themselves by considering how PEA is utilised in 
the context of the complex, open-ended interactions between development agencies, 
consultants and other stakeholders involved in policymaking. Section 5 concludes 
that its usefulness as a tool for promoting romantic as well as reformist development 
management depends upon the freedom, willingness and capacity of users to adapt 
their own objectives and operational modalities in the light of what PEA reveals.  
Preoccupation with results-based management rooted in rational actor ontology, 
limits the scope for its use in more open-ended and imaginative ways.  
 
2. PEA a brief overview:  
PEA is used by development agencies to enhance their understanding of the 
economic, political and social processes that drive or block policy reform. Their 
immediate purpose is to inform design, feasibility assessment, and implementation 
of development initiatives with a view to enhancing their effectiveness. 
 
2.1 Three leading examples 
Three PEA frameworks used by leading donors are briefly outlined below.2  The 
selection captures variation in the scope of analysis from national to sector level, as 
well as the chronological progression towards more focused and action-oriented 
                                               
2 Other PEA frameworks that could have been included are SIDA’s Power Analysis, the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry's Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA), EC Sector Analysis, ODI’s 
sector framework (Moncrieffe and Luttrell 2005) and Leftwich (2006a&b, 2007). Also particularly 
relevant is the work of Grindle (2010; 2011) and analysis of (in)security, welfare and well-being 
regimes (Gough and Wood, 2004; Gough and McGregor, 2007; Copestake and Wood, 2008). Other 
reviews of PEA frameworks include Endlemen (2009) and Haider and Rao (2010).  
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analysis. We focus on broad conceptual frameworks offered by each approach, rather 
than more specific operational tools to facilitate their use (cf. World Bank, 2007).  
 
Drivers of change (DoC) analysis (DFID 2004) 
DoC was launched by DFID in 2001 and was used during the next few years to 
inform more than twenty country studies (Leftwich, 2006a; Scott, 2007). These sought 
to understand the main progressive and regressive political forces influencing 
poverty reduction. Although individual champions of reform are sought, drivers of 
change are viewed more broadly. A distinction is made between (a) structural 
features, or natural and human resources, economic and social structures; (b) agents, 
or individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests, and (c) mediating 
institutions, comprising frameworks and rules structuring the behaviour of agents.  
The DoC framework avoids imposing a more elaborate framework on 
analysts, seeking instead to assist DFID country offices in identifying and 
understanding political dynamics most relevant to design of pro-poor interventions. 
The logical sequence is from detached analysis of country level dynamics (how the 
world is), to assessment relative to the normative goal of poverty reduction (how it 
should be), then finally to an assessment of what DFID can do to close the gap (how 
it could be).  
 
The political economy of policy reform (World Bank 2008) 
This framework is intended to aid sector level reforms, and builds on evidence from 
World Bank engagement in agricultural marketing, water supply and sanitation 
sectors. The approach highlights distributional implications of proposed reforms 
through a threefold sequence of analysis, process and action. The “analysis” stage 
seeks understanding of how rules governing selected sectors are generated, followed 
and contested. This includes identification of key stakeholders and their role in each 
stage of the policy development process (from problem diagnosis to implementation) 
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as well as links from the selected sector to relevant institutional and decision-making 
structures at the national level. 
 The “process” stage addresses modalities for stakeholder interaction (e.g. 
partnerships, participation and leadership) and how these affect information flows, 
coalition building, public debate and transparency. The “action” stage extends 
analysis into reform implementation. This includes monitoring the political economy 
of timing and sequencing of reforms to inform pragmatic, flexible and strategic 
responses. It also emphasises the need to schedule “partnership-based reform 
debate” and to sustain the evidence base for policy making through monitoring, 
evaluation and communication strategies, including creating new channels for 
accountability. 
 
Problem-driven governance and political economy analysis (World Bank 2009) 
This framework aims to assist World Bank teams to learn “best practice” lessons 
from reform, provide them with a “menu of options” for conducting good diagnostic 
studies and translating them into action. Rather than offering a broad national 
analysis or sector focus it addresses a particular institutional problem or constraint. It 
also aims to identify how momentum for change can be fostered, thereby 
overcoming criticism of earlier governance assessments for a static emphasis on 
institutional gaps and weaknesses.   
There are again three stages: to identify a problem, challenge or 
“vulnerability”, to map relevant institutional and governance arrangements, and 
third to identify the political economy drivers and obstacles to change. The crux of 
the approach is on why institutional arrangements or policies are not supportive of a 
particular reform process.  This is built around a distinction between structures, 
institutions and actors similar to that of DoC analysis. At the same time it seeks to 
link analysis of risks facing particular policy reforms to strategies that World Bank 
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country programmes can use to addressing them. This includes understanding 
strategies of other stakeholders, and opportunities for the World Bank to influence 
them in the political realm.  It highlights the use of different types of communication 
strategies to build support for change, emphasising how the initial PEA can influence 
the type of policy dialogue to be used - from passive (“do no harm”), to active 
coalition building. It also provides in-depth guidance on what information to collect 
and how to analyse it. 
 
Similarities 
Table 1 summarises the distinctive focus of each framework on overall national 
political economy, sector-specific and problem-specific issues. At the same time it is 
the similarities between them that are perhaps more striking. All three explore links 
between a structural context for an intervention, the key stakeholders affected and 
the influence of institutions on stakeholders’ opportunities and incentives for action. 
These similarities reflect common conceptual origins and academic reference points 
within the wider literature on economic institutions, governance and policy making 
in low and middle income countries.3 Linked research into aid effectiveness forced 
staff in development agencies to recognise that it was inadequate for them to blame 
the failure of many supposedly ‘good’ policies on poor implementation or lack of 
‘political will.’ More fundamentally, attempting to reconcile the case for enhancing 
‘domestic ownership’ of policies without necessarily abandoning their own views 
prompted closer engagement with local policy processes (Hyden, 2008).  
 
Table 1: Summary of distinctive features of the three frameworks.   
                                               
3 These include Stiglitz on market failures, North on path-dependency, Grindle on policy analysis, 
Bates on the politics of economic reform and Williamson on institutional embeddedness.  More rarely 
cited is Mahoney and Thelen (2009) on institutional change, and Powleson’s (1994) work on power 
diffusion that anticipated the contribution of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
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PEA framework  Distinctive features  
Drivers of Change  ­ Simple and flexible framework that can be adapted to diverse country 
contexts. 
­ Aims for a comprehensive evolutionary analysis of country’s 
economic, social and political characteristics. 
The Political Economy 
of Policy Reform.  
­ Evidence based, having been built from a comprehensive set of sector 
case studies.  
­ Focus on the political dynamics of policy change: how reforms are 
tabled and why, how they are perceived, who supports, opposes and 
attempts to change them.   
­ Includes an action framework to assist in translating analysis into 
operational implications. Emphasises the need to build partnerships 
and coalitions for change to overcome political sensitivity and to create 
the space for evidence-based discussion, negotiation and policy 
making.   
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis 
­ Centres on a specific issue or problem with a view to guiding action as 
well as analysis. 
­ Provides examples of PEA in action, and highlights operational 
implications of different stages of analysis. For example how it maps 
onto the World Bank’s operational strategy and types of public 
dialogue appropriate to each. 
 
In addition, the World Bank frameworks attempt to respond to criticism of DoC 
(elaborated below in section 2.2) for being short on guidance about how to use PEA 
to inform programme strategies. This is illustrated by Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Operational guidance included in PEA 
PEA framework Guidance to inform programme activity 
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis  
­ Assists policy engagement and “partnership based reform 
programmes” through a flexible approach that manages risks, public 
dialogue and “coalitions for change.”  
­ Links analysis and communication strategies through understanding 
stakeholder concerns and facilitating wider engagement where needed.   
­ Provides information on what is feasible for external actors and 
therefore how to influence strategies in the short and long term.  This 
includes analysis of current strategies of stakeholders and potential 
windows of opportunity. 
­ Highlights scope for using PEA to enhance policy dialogue and foster 
innovative approaches to operations through a more granular 
understanding of the behaviour of stakeholders. For example going 
  9
past the proponents/opponents dichotomy. 
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis  
­ Provides information on what is feasible for external actors to 
influence strategies over the short and long term.  This includes 
analysis of the strategies of other stakeholders and of potential 
windows for opportunity. 
­ Takes into account and manages risks; for example through public 
dialogue strategies and building coalitions for change. 
­ Integrates evidence-based policy making with partnership based 
reform programmes. 
­ Links analysis with monitoring and evaluation, and with 
communication strategy, through improved understanding stakeholder 
concerns, leading to more participatory approaches where needed.   
­ Realign accountability frameworks through analysis of demand and 
supply for information. 
 
2.2. Critical debate over PEA. 
PEA as a mainstream development management tool is still relatively new, but has 
already been the subject of substantial critical discussion (Unsworth, 2007; 2008; 2009; 
Leftwich, 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Duncan and Williams, 2012; Grindle, 2010; 2011; and 
World Bank Institute and CommGap, 2010, for example).  
Four perceived strengths of PEA can first be identified. First, while 
proponents of PEA did not, of course, introduce the analysis of institutions into 
development practice, they can claim to have promoted a wider and more realistic 
understanding of their functions including the importance of informal norms and 
beliefs. This has helped to counter simplistic assumptions that development can 
proceed through transfer or promotion of universal ‘best practices’ with a greater 
appreciation of contextual constraints. Landell-Mills et al (2007; 2), suggests that the 
focus on institutions, particularly informal institutions, amounts to a ‘new political 
economy perspective’ (NPEP) – “The most striking feature of the NPEP is that it combines 
a strong sociological component with political analysis, taking account of embedded beliefs, 
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cultural norms and ethnicity that change only gradually, and yet have a profound influence 
on the way agents act and react…”4 
Second, PEA has promoted a more open discussion of power within the donor 
community and of the political processes through which policy is both formulated 
and implemented. This has promoted deeper analysis of stakeholders’ capacity to 
subvert and countered simplistic explanations of policy failure as ‘lack of political 
will’. By giving donors greater insight into commitment and capacity for country-led 
reform PEA thereby directly addresses the aid effectiveness agenda, though it leaves 
open the question of how far they are themselves willing and able to adjust their 
strategies accordingly. 
A third and more general point, linked to both of these is that PEA has 
injected greater realism into development policy and practice and the need to engage 
with the political struggle. Fourth, the development of PEA frameworks and tools 
bring a more systematic approach to analysis, in pursuit of methodological 
consistency. This opens up the possibility that tacit knowledge and hard-won 
experience of individuals can be lodged more firmly in institutional memory. 
Unsworth (2008;1), illustrates the last two points by stating that PEA “contrasts with 
more normative approaches to governance assessment that focus on how formal 
institutions are performing, or political reporting of embassies that tends to be 
preoccupied with current events and actors.”  
 At the same time, practitioners continue to find weaknesses in PEA as a 
development tool, citing the failure to change fundamentally the way agencies 
operate (Thornton and Cox, 2005; DFID 2005; Landell-Mills et al, 2007; Unsworth, 
2007; and Foresti and Wild, 2009). While recognising that PEA has contributed to a 
deeper understanding of the nature of development problems, it remains less clear to 
                                               
4 Leftwich (2006a) caveats this by highlighting that the conceptual ambiguity between structural 
features and institutions in DoC studies partly led to largely agent centric analysis with broader social 
and cultural influences not fully incorporated or explained. 
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them how useful it is in identifying solutions. This section reviews four criticisms: 
excessive scope, which makes it hard to draw specific conclusions; overly abstract 
language; the politically sensitive nature of findings; and the organisational 
difficulties of translating findings into action. 
The scoping problem was highlighted by a review of early DoC studies 
(Thornton and Cox, 2005). They were found to generate broad conclusions about 
underlying influences on change within selected countries, for example the 
recognition of neo-patrimonial relationships. But this was at the expense of more 
detailed analysis of specific agencies and their incentives, and in the absence of such 
analysis it was difficult for donors to identify and prioritise stakeholders who they 
could align with most effectively. In addition the focus on historical processes, 
particularly in the case of DoC distracted attention from understanding the more 
relevant short to medium term dynamics of reform (Leftwich, 2006; Haider and Rao, 
2010).   
Second, non-specialists find the academic language used in PEA studies 
abstract and often over-elaborate. At the same time detailed description of the 
numerous groups and structures in society confront them with a level of institutional 
complexity that is hard to incorporate into standardised country strategies and 
logical frameworks. It was also not feasible to collect the data and evidence required 
to ground theoretical frameworks adequately in local empirical reality (Haider and 
Rao, 2010).  
 Third, the political sensitivity of these studies inhibited dissemination of 
results and thereby limited scope for dialogue with local actors over the findings.  An 
evaluation by DFID into DoC studies concluded that they were most successful 
when tailored versions of reports were presented to different audiences (DFID, 2005; 
Haider and Rao, 2010).  As Landell-Mills et al (2007) note “a key challenge is to find 
ways to conduct such studies in a manner that is non-confrontational, but avoids 
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being secretive.” Indeed there is inherent tension in the extent to which such studies 
can lead to enhanced ownership; joint studies present the potential for increased 
contextual understanding and ownership of its findings and operational implications 
but risk bias or suppression. Unsworth (2009) highlights the fear among donors that 
sharing or implementing findings of PEA could jeopardize important relationships 
or “rock the boat.”  
PEA can pose a similar risk for bilateral agencies with respect to relations with 
their political principals and accountability to taxpayers. For example, Duncan and 
Williams (2010) point out that second best or “good enough” solutions suggested by 
PEA  are harder to explain and to justify than, say, direct investments in schools and 
roads. As Grindle (2011; 2) states, “scholars of development rise fast if they produce 
parsimonious truths rather than complicated options.” This reflects the norm of 
presenting development as technical rather than political, and is reinforced by 
internal performance structures that incentivise disbursement of funds or 
deployment of technical experts.5 While PEA can still be justified as a tool for 
managing programme risks, emphasis on demonstrable impact and value for money 
can work against interventions aimed at tackling deeper and more long-term 
institutional issues (Eyben, 2008).  
There appear to be clear diagnostic benefits of PEA but significant challenges 
remain in translating these into donors’ existing operational practices to enhance aid 
effectiveness. The ideal may be that PEA frameworks furnishes a deeper  
understanding of local problems, institutions and ways of addressing them; the 
reality may be that they do little more than embellish engrained intervention models 
used by donors informed by perceived deviation from universal ideals of ‘good 
governance’ with very little regard to local specifics (Grindle, 2007). Unsworth 
                                               
5 Duncan and Williams (2010) also highlight other factors such as an inflated view of donors 
importance; a preference for working with formal institutions and a lack of understanding of the 
informal.  In practical terms, overly-rapid staff turnover restricts staff from being able to develop the 
necessary depth of understanding.  
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(2007;1) argues that this is the case at the corporate level within donors, with an 
essentially technocratic approach continuing to dominate. She states that “overall, 
the impact of political science research has been patchy. Policymakers may be talking 
about politics, while still thinking in quite conventional ways about governance and 
development.” 
 
3. PEA and Development Management Theory. 
At its most general, PEA is necessary for any public or private organisation, 
particularly in turbulent and uncertain times (e.g. The Economist, 2011:74). If broadly 
defined as a form of horizon scanning and problem diagnosis, then its integration 
into strategic decision making is a generic management problem. The narrower issue 
pursued here is with the micro-level politics of using PEA to inform the strategies 
and actions of development agencies themselves.   
Our starting point is a longstanding tendency in the academic literature on 
development administration and management for schism (McCourt and Gulrajani, 
2010). On one side are reformist writers, who while not uncritical of existing practice, 
accept that promoting poverty reduction and related development through planned, 
rational, technical and controlled processes is at least possible. In opposition are 
writers for whom management (pejoratively labelled ‘managerialism’) is anathema 
to development as a political process of empowerment and emancipation of the 
many. Gulrajani (2010:136) calls this contemporary radical perspective “Critical 
Development Management (CDM)” to reflect its roots in both “Foucauldian post-
development theory and neo-Marxian critical management studies.”6 By tracing the 
origins of managerialism, as a rational scientific pathway to progress, back to its 18th 
Century Enlightenment roots she opens up the possibility of a more imaginative, 
                                               
6 Gulrajani (2011) finesses this distinction further by noting the existence of left and right wing 
variants of the radical critique of aid effectiveness, united only in their critique of mainstream 
reformism.  
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intuitive, and value-laden “romantic” perspective on development perspective. This, 
she suggests, represents a distinct form of “non-managerial development practice” 
that is neither reformist nor radical. Three key characteristics of this tradition she 
suggests are: first, a strong emphasis on diverse experiential knowledge; second, an 
emphasis on performance, improvisation and intuition; and third, a heightened 
degree of reflexivity among practitioners rooted in the unavoidably contingent and 
contested nature of their practice.7 This echoes Richards (1989), who compares small-
scale farmers to musicians in order to extol their local knowledge and creative 
improvisation, contrasting this with a more mechanical view of their role as passive 
recipients of extension advice from all-knowing agricultural scientists.  
An alternative route to a similar conclusion about development practice starts 
from an explicit recognition of complexity and uncertainty as core experiences of 
development practitioners (Ramalingam, 2008).  Confronted with the impossibility of 
being all-knowing, people are forced to act on the basis of simplified mental models 
(North, 1990). The diversity of their experience produces a multiplicity of such 
models, and limits the scope for agreement on a single overarching vision or plan.8 
Instead fragmented and often competing ideas regarding development proliferate, 
with no one position or stakeholder capable of capturing the full picture. As Enberg-
Perderson (2012) explains one response to this has been the decentralisation of aid 
agencies in an attempt to accommodate and promote such diversity.  However, 
which ideas or visions are legitimised and become dominant depends on messy 
processes of interaction that reflect prevailing power imbalances (Eyben, 2008).  
                                               
7 Bronk (2009) identifies the romantic tradition in economics as drawing more upon organic than 
mechanistic metaphors, emphasising non-commensurable values, resisting over-reliance on rational 
actor assumptions about individual motivation and emphasising the importance of imagination.  
8 See also Denzau and North (1994) for a discussion of the idea of shared mental models. North 
(1990;17) observes that “individuals make choices based on subjectively derived models... the 
information actors receive is so incomplete that in most cases these divergent subjective models show 
no tendency to converge.” 
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This is not to diminish the importance of seeking new understanding, 
building consensus and developing coherent plans for action. But it helps to explain 
why such endeavours often fail, and serves as a reminder that development is not 
the logical outcome of negotiations between all-knowing actors, but an evolutionary 
process replete with discoveries, surprises and accidents (Mowles et al. 2008; 
Mowles, 2010). PEA, from this perspective, can itself be viewed as embellishing a 
relatively narrow and technocratic shared mental model of development 
management as rational planning. Rather than a mutual examination of the aid 
process it can reinforce an outward focus, with the development agency itself largely 
absent from diagnostic analysis, except as one stakeholder in the mix - with its own 
internal norms, competing mental models, interests, internal politics and processes 
off limits.  
In turning the analytical spotlight of PEA back on the sponsoring 
development agency itself we connect with a wider “aidnography” literature that 
emphasises the value of empirical research into how development works, as well as 
whether it succeeds (Lewis and Mosse, 2006). This also links with Gulrajani’s (2012), 
examination of how different environments, governance structures, goals and levels 
of discretion influence donor organisations. This sets the scene for future research 
into the extent to which PEA may reform but ultimately reinforce a managerial 
process of aid intervention, or open up new romantic possibilities for interaction 
among PEA analyst, client and other stakeholders and ultimately contribute to 
enhanced development effectiveness. 
 
4. Problematising development practice. 
4.1. From intervention to interaction models. 
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In its current guise, discussion of PEA is relatively silent on the micro-politics of the 
commissioning development agency itself: it is generally assumed to play a passive 
role in the analysis, and then appears as a deus ex machina at the intervention stage.  
The implication is that who carries out a PEA, and how, is not relevant to how it is 
used. Professionally conducted PEA should aspire to inform the commissioning 
agency in a way that is both dispassionate and objective. However, as demand for 
more detailed, prescriptive, practical and positive forms of PEA grows so the 
likelihood of bias and omission is likely to be higher, hence the imperative of 
exploring more openly and realistically the process by which PEA is produced and 
utilised. The discussion of complexity in the previous section reinforces the case for 
paying closer attention to how PEA relates to aid processes and relationships. More 
flexible, adaptable and improvised approaches imply a need for a more fluid and 
granular interaction between analysis and action. In exploring the move from 
intervention to interaction frameworks of development practice this section explores 
how this entails a more explicit treatment of the micro-politics of relations between 
donors and other stakeholders, including the consultants they commission to assist 
them with PEA.  
A starting point for this discussion is the dominant mode of development 
action as a series of time bound episodes of planned intervention based on explicit 
goals, causal steps and resource requirements - often in the form of a logical 
framework. The DoC framework echoes this in distinguishing between how things 
are, how they should be and how to close the gap. More generally, PEA can 
contribute to the identification of the causal chains by which development goals are 
to be achieved by ensuring deployment of agency resources in ways that are more 
congruent and align with local structures and institutions. It can also assist in 
appraising the capacities and incentives of other stakeholders required to deliver 
complementary resources, and the risks of opposition or indifference. PEA can also 
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assist in appraisal of modalities for scaling up or mainstreaming pilot interventions. 
Likewise it can play an important role in evaluation of why projects fail.  
Much of the criticism of this position is based on the view that what 
development agencies take on is simply too complicated to be planned in this way 
(Hirschman, 1967:1-9; Easterly, 2006; Barder, 2010; Mowles et al, 2008 and Mowles, 
2010).9 PEA can then be viewed as part of the reformist quest to render complex 
problems manageable and negotiable - or what Grint (2005) calls “tame” - by 
revealing all relevant stakeholder interests.  This may be better   than another 
response to complexity, which is simply to avoid it byrestricting interventions to  
simpler tasks that can be achieved and evaluated more reliably (e.g. using 
randomized experiments): a response that has an additional advantage for those 
seeking to reduce aid budgets.. A  third response is to reframe development 
management in a way that more explicitly recognises its complexity as a “wicked 
problem” (Grint, 2005) that requires more consultative, exploratory  iterative 
strategies. 
In appropriating the idea of a “wicked problem” and distinguishing it from 
those that are “tame” and “critical” Grint (2005) is not suggesting that all problems 
can objectively be classified as one or the other. Rather he sees the framing of 
problems in this way as a means by which leaders can  legitimise their  authority and 
build support for preferred styles of action.  Presenting problems as critical” 
legitimises coercive responses, or the use of hard power; presenting them as “tame” 
suggests scope for calculative and negotiated solutions, but “wicked” problems 
favour a leadership style that consults and invites wider collaboration. Thus while 
the use of PEA frameworks reviewed in this paper can be criticised along with 
logical framework analysis as an attempt to sanitise and professionalise development 
                                               
9 An important variant on this position is that development may not be inherently complex, but made 
so by meddling “counter-bureaucrats” who insist on impossibly tight and rigorous procedures for 
monitoring expenditure and measuring results (Natsios, 2010).   
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management (Mowles, 2010:153), a less reified approach to its use also has the 
potential to inform more open political debate about development and greater 
consultation, including that between donor and recipient policymakers (see also 
Booth, 2011).   
Grint’s suggestion that the way complex problems are framed is unavoidably 
political or ideological suggests scope  for PEA to incorporate a  richer and more 
explicit comparison of the contrasting ways of thinking or ’mental models’ of  key 
stakeholders in any project. The bigger the project and the more diverse the range of 
stakeholders the more complex is the task of ensuring that there is sufficient mutual 
understanding not only of key goals, but also rules and norms of how to pursue 
them. Copestake (2011), contrasts “single gap” thinking implicit in much PEA with 
“triple gap” thinking in development practice that systematically identifies such 
disjuncture.10 A growing “aidnography” literature attests to the often disastrous 
effects of such disconnects (Lewis and Mosse, 2006). Indeed given the desire for 
supporting recipient countries ownership understanding the nature and strength of 
such disconnects is critical to successful implementation. While such failure can 
conveniently be attributed by donors to others, they also share responsibility for not 
anticipating and adapting to non-aligned priorities and incentives.11  
However, disjuncture or disconnect between stakeholders are rarely solely 
semantic. Indeed power structures underpinning the aid chain itself often limit the 
scope for improvised or romantic development management.  For example, 
Grammig (2002) provides a detailed ethnographic study of such dynamics based on 
                                               
10 The first gap is the difference between universal goals of development (e.g. the MDGs) and 
estimates of how far they are attained by a designated group. A second gap is the difference between 
the goals or aspirations of this group and how satisfied they are with achievement of them. The third 
gap is the difference between these two perspectives.  
11 Martins et al. (2002) formally explore these issues using principal-agency theory and other standard 
tools of microeconomics, with particular reference to the role of consultants’ provision of technical 
assistance. Williamson (2008) investigates varying degrees of donor and government alignment in 
Ethiopia. Bevan (2000) reveals wide divergence among stakeholders in their perception of whether 
development consultancies were successful or not. 
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case studies of two technology transfer projects involving three parties – donor, 
expatriate ‘expert’ and local counterpart. He found that the effectiveness of both 
projects was constrained by tensions between expatriates and locals arising not from 
cross-cultural misunderstandings or technical disagreements, but from structural 
differences in their relationship to the timing and financing of the project by donors, 
including differences in capacity to exit from the project. Any PEA that excluded 
these aspects of projects’ design would have revealed little about their success or 
failure.12  
This discussion suggests that any role PEA can play in shifting the meta-
mental model of development management from mechanistic/mainstream to 
organic/romantic requires more explicit discussion of the politics of who conducts 
PEA, for whom and how. In short, and somewhat ironically, the political 
implications of PEA often remain inadequately conceptualised. Hughes and 
Hutchison (2008:18) make this point particularly forcefully: “there has been 
insufficient recognition that contention over development represents more than 
transitory conflict over temporary or compensable costs attached to the process of 
change. The donor literature retains these weak conceptions of politics precisely 
because they permit avoidance of the full implications of political analysis: namely the 
need to take sides politically in order to promote poverty reduction goals.” Having 
made this point they then draw a useful distinction between opportunistic, 
pragmatic and idealistic practice that hinges on how far donors rely on tactical 
alliances with powerful interests, or seek more fundamental political transformation 
through direct empowerment of the poor and politically weak. 
 
4.2. The role of the PEA practitioner: from Marx to Machiavelli? 
                                               
12 See also the distinction between foreign versus indigenously introduced indigenous and exogenous 
institutions explored by Boettke et al. (2008).  
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In the remainder of this section we examine the implications of this argument for the 
practical task of carrying out PEA. The immediate issue facing any development 
agency commissioning such work is to make a realistic assessment of its own 
comparative advantage. PEA may be conducted by the agency’s own staff, or it may 
be contracted out to consultants, including those with important local contextual 
knowledge. This obviously has a bearing on how far the PEA is expected to move 
from diagnosis to detailed policy prescription. In separating PEA from its use, those 
commissioning the study implicitly assume they (or other sub-contractors) will be 
better able than the PEA consultant to address these downstream tasks separately. 
The flipside of an external consultant’s possible lack of insider knowledge is critical 
detachment and possibly a better understanding of how the agency is perceived by 
others. But allowing an outsider to shine the analytical spotlight of PEA too strongly 
onto the commissioning organisation itself is potentially distracting, internally 
destabilising and politically risky. 
Even within a bilateral contractual relationship for an entirely externally 
focused PEA, a consultant may move beyond the role of obedient servant (bound by 
formal terms of reference) by offering informal views about the need for internal 
changes.13 For example, the PEA may be intended specifically to provide key internal 
messages that build on prior relationships of the analyst. PEA may also serve both as 
a loss-leader for the consultant and as a pre-screening device for the commissioner. 
In the language of institutional economics, consultants seeking new markets compete 
in selection tournaments to lower the initial information asymmetry between 
principal and agent. If so, then success entails not only demonstrating professional 
competence as an analyst but also political savvy in coming in ‘on-message’. Indeed, 
the art is even finer: the analyst needs to convincingly justify the political message in 
                                               
13 Andersson and Auer (2005) explore these issues by drawing on interviews with contractors for the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Zambia. Wood (1998) offers a rare 
in-depth case study of competition between consultants thrown together in a single aid mission. See 
also Mahoney and Thelen (2009) for a useful classification of different kinds of change agents.  
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the language of dispassionate PEA; and at the same time judge how far it is possible 
to go ‘off message’ in order to retain professional and personal integrity and 
reputation. This is also a game played over several rounds, as mutual trust generates 
opportunities for analysts to win follow-up work, participate in internal debates 
within the commissioning agency and represent it externally. 
More experienced consultants and counterparts are likely to have learnt how 
to work around tensions arising from the micro-political economy of their 
contrasting relationship to development modalities and finance. For example, at 
critical moments in building a working relationship they may find ways to signal to 
each other how their personal and official views (and identity) diverge. However, in 
doing so they take the risk that any break from the official norms and rules of their 
structural relationship may backfire. And the possibility of virtuoso cross-cultural 
performance should not obscure the dominant position of the funder to dictate terms 
of the consultancy.  
Emphasising the complexity, diversity and uncertainty of the terrain for 
development management also suggests a more fluid role for the political economy 
practitioner, such as that specified by Room’s (2011) “agile policy toolkit”.  He 
highlights eight non-sequential processes of policy making which the agile policy 
maker must continuously weave between, adapting to situations and allowing each 
of these processes to co-evolve with the others.14 This requires a conventional PEA 
framework/toolkit to be augmented with a ‘reflexive’ focus to take into account the 
two (or more sides) of the aid relationship. In this sense, PEA can be viewed as a 
sequential game of joint and independent analysis and action between potential 
collaborators. Joint action creates new opportunities for information sharing and 
analysis, and vice versa; thereby opening up possible virtuous circles of deepening 
                                               
14 They are: map the landscape, identify the protagonists, model the struggle, watch for tipping points, 
tune the landscape, energise the protagonists, civilise the struggle, watch for predators. For a 
summary explanation see, http://www.bath.ac.uk/soc-pol/people/gjroom-policy-making.html  
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collaboration, as well as vicious circles of estrangement and conflict. Proceeding 
cautiously, an important part of the role of PEA is to identify obstacles as well as 
opportunities. This makes it politically sensitive and opens up the potential for a 
trade-off between openness and potency of analysis. Formal aid modalities based on 
rational-actor assumptions and tidy logical frameworks can serve as a convenient 
smokescreen for the messy informal politics that inevitably occupy much of 
practitioners’ time (Eyben, 2010). 
This section has suggested that practical PEA requires the analytical skills of 
Machiavelli as well as of Marx. There are two points here. The first is about the need 
to incorporate the micro-politics of development agencies own inter-relationships 
into PEA. The second is that doing recognises at least some room for manoeuvre on 
the part of the commissioning development agency to change the way it operates in 
the light of such analysis.  These points are explored further in Section 5 which 
points towards an approach to PEA that is both more self-critical and iterative. 
  
5. Finding the spaces for change.  
This final section provides some tentative views on the future possibilities for more 
reflexive and interactive PEA to enhance development effectiveness.  This is 
elaborated through reflection, in the light of the arguments put forward in the 
previous section, on five areas for reform of PEA practice identified by practitioners 
(World Bank Institute and CommGap, 2010). In each case we contrast a reformist 
position with more radical and romantic perspectives. 
 
 (a) Identifying room for manoeuvre for reform. 
A common worry is that increased realism generated by PEA can contribute to 
fatalism, and loss of belief in the feasibility of reform. For example, Duncan and 
Williams (2012) note the risk of PEA being regarded as “the dismal science of 
constraints” and while others emphasise the need to seek (and presumably find) 
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possibilities for change and ways in which PEA can assist in promoting local 
approaches to resolving problems. As Levy (2011), an architect of the World Bank’s 
thinking to PEA, comments, effective action works with the grain of a dynamic, 
adaptive process in the hope it can “nudge” it forward.15 
From a radical perspective this point illustrates the charade of much of the 
effort to ground development practice in reality – nudging towards the same end 
goals still implies a rational controlled intervention model. It also illustrates the way 
in which consultants may be forced to prostitute themselves if they are to maintain 
favour with clients: while there is much talk of evidence based policy making, this 
always opens up possibilities for policy based selection of supportive evidence. From 
a more romantic perspective, in contrast, a more realistic understanding of local 
political constraints and complexity may strengthen support for deeper and more 
open consultation  in pursuit of more contextualised policy. And greater recognition 
of this reinforces the case for optimism and experimentation: better false positives 
than false negatives. 
 
(b) Knowledge-driven change: combining diagnosis and coalition building.  
Much of development practice can be regarded as a process of establishing the basis 
for collective action to promote pro-poor change. However, there is a lack of clarity 
within PEA between this task and that of data collection and analysis. The World 
Bank approaches presented in this paper aim to identify and provide a focal point for 
change: clearly communicating the benefits of collective action; revealing the 
credibility and legitimacy (or otherwise) of potential stakeholders; generating 
evidence and providing the rationale for broadening coalitions; and last but not least, 
helping to get the timing and sequencing of action right.    
                                               
15 Work by the Centre for the Future State (IDS, 2010) and ODI’s ‘Africa Power and Politics’ 
programme provide specific examples. See also Booth (2011) which sets out the potential role for 
development actors in facilitating collective action solving through informed political analysis. 
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 From a radical perspective this again errs on the side of misplaced optimism 
in focusing on long-term positive-sum games rather than the short-term zero-sum 
struggles that are the stuff of ‘tribal’ politics between well entrenched interests. On 
the other hand, recognition that analysis and action cannot be rigidly demarcated, 
and that differences in perception are key influences on policy outcomes is meat-and-
drink to a romantic perspective. The view that collective action is a messy and 
cumulative trial-and-error process of building coalitions also fits well with a 
romantic and complexity perspective on development practice (Room 2011).  In this 
sense, rather than informing the ‘alignment strategies’ of development agencies 
through seeking specific ‘progressive change elements’, the role of PEA is to identify 
networks and relationships where consultation and collaboration, mutual learning,  
exploration of divergent mental models and emergent possibilities might occur.  
 
(c) Challenging knowledge production processes: for whom and by whom. 
The World Bank and CommGap (2010) conference report is mostly consistent with 
the two World Bank frameworks in emphasising the role of PEA in supporting the 
political activities of other stakeholders in favour of reform. This entails giving more 
emphasis to dissemination of information to selected local actors and their 
participation in analysis. More specifically, it suggests a stronger focus on civil 
society to address the “chronic misalignment of objectives between donors and client 
governments(Ibid; 4).“ To do so, all commentators argue that the findings of PEA 
need to be clearer and simpler.   
 What is most striking about this is the extent to which engagement with civil 
society is presented not as a form of dialogue but as a means to achieving already 
finalised development goals. This can be interpreted from a radical perspective as a 
brazen bid to co-opt civil society onto the side of donor ‘patrons’ in their struggle to 
secure compliance of ‘client’ governments. Further, the reformist desire to make PEA 
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‘clearer’ reaffirms its position as an instrumental tool.  In contrast, innovation in 
knowledge production from a romantic perspective starts with recognition of 
pervasive uncertainty and the fragmented nature of understanding. Ambiguity and 
disagreement may open up space for open, plural and reciprocal learning leading to 
more creative policy possibilities. This suggests movement from set piece PEA 
studies to a more iterative approach to PEA that involves more stakeholders in the 
knowledge production process.  
 
(d) Operationalising PEA. 
Reformist ideas for improving the operational value of PEA include: refining tools 
for mapping actors and gaining a better insight into their incentives; developing 
innovative ways to link coalition groups together to address collective action issues, 
including through use of cell phones and other technology; incorporating PEA more 
fully into monitoring and evaluation to assess real time risks to reform processes; 
moving from standardised frameworks to sector and problem specific approaches; 
and linking PEA to scenario analysis, which can then be used to elicit feedback and 
build links with key stakeholders. Enhancing the predictive element of PEA, 
including through better gauging of public and private sector opinion, can also help 
build the case for context specific or “second best” policy choices relative to universal 
prescriptions (Endlemen 2009).   
 Such suggestions indicate support for more open co-production of PEA, and 
for relaxing the boundary between analysis and action. But they do not seem to 
challenge the basic assumption that donor agencies commissioning PEA should 
remain at the centre of policy development processes. In addition, they do not 
change the fundamental framing that donor agencies can predict and control 
processes of development. Nor do they go very far in reflecting on the broad political 
economy of donors themselves within the policy process. Mowles et al. (2008) also 
emphasise the methodological individualism inherent in logical frameworks and 
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similar planning tools - with complexity relegated to the ‘assumptions and risks’ 
column. To that end PEA becomes another tool or lever to use to achieve change.   
A more complex and less prescriptive PEA recognises the potential benefits of 
accommodating messier but more open processes of interaction and performance in 
policy-making. Approaching problems with agility and art entails being more honest 
about the shared knowledge base on which decisions are made, the inevitability of 
making mistakes, the importance of learning from them, and the challenge of trying 
to hit constantly moving targets. This is not incompatible with target setting and 
measurement of results but does have a bearing on how they are set (including room 
for more cooperation), as well as how shortfalls are interpreted.  
 
(e) Mainstreaming PEA within development practice. 
A number of commentators highlighted the challenge of publically airing politically 
sensitive views. This is despite topics such as corruption and vested interests being 
increasingly discussed in mainstream policy debate. Participants recognised that 
consistency demands PEA should likewise stimulate debate over the internal 
constraints on donors to mainstreaming PEA within policy design and 
implementation, including the need to deliver and demonstrate quick and 
measurable results within rigid and often unrealistic timeframes.  The recognition of 
the structural constraints to donor practice fits well with the more reflexive romantic 
perspective on aid management. The international dialogue on aid effectiveness 
leading to Busan can be cited as evidence that there is some willingness to 
acknowledge the institutional problems of donors alongside those of aid recipients 
and explore an agenda for addressing both based on mutual accountability.    
A radical response is to be sceptical that PEA of development agencies 
themselves will greatly weaken Western control over donor policies or significantly 
modify the way they operate. Both the managerialist approach adopted at Paris to 
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measure and monitor progress against fixed targets, and lack of sanctions in 
punishing failure to achieve them can be cited as evidence of this. In reverting to 
more fluid dialogue around a diverse set of ‘building blocks’ the outcome of Busan 
suggests a more romantic approach, but one open to criticism in turn for lack of 
specificity and ‘teeth’ from both reformist and radical perspectives. But the change in 
style can in part be attributed to the need to accommodate non-traditional donors, 
opening up new possibilities of departure from the dominance of Western influence 
(via the OECD as well as the World Bank) over the aid industry.  
 
Conclusion. 
This paper has examined the interest of traditional aid donors in PEA, exploring 
ongoing debates among its practitioners over how to make it more useful in the light 
of theoretical debates over the nature of development management.  In viewing aid 
effectiveness as a complex  problem we have highlighted the importance not only of 
increased consultation but also reflexivity and adaptability on the part of donors. If 
PEA is regarded solely as a technocratic means to better understanding the 
commitment and capacity of others, without opening up opportunities for internal 
learning and adjustment, then its role in enhancing aid effectiveness will be 
correspondingly limited.  Indeed there is a somewhat sinister aspect to suggesting 
improvements to the toolkit of PEA by brushing up on Machiavelli as well as Marx. 
Recognising that development management is in reality less a form of intervention 
than a process of interaction and discovery we have affirmed the romantic case for 
more open dialogue and for closer integration of analysis and action.16  
At the same time reformist, radical and romantic positions can be viewed as 
alternative mental models for addressing not a single development problem but a 
complex, diverse and uncertain set of inter-related development problems. If so, then 
                                               
16 See Copestake and Williams (2012) for an attempt to systematise these arguments in the form of an 
alternative framework for PEA that emphasises reflexivity, agility and specificity.  
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their relative explanatory power will vary: some development tasks are more 
complex than others. Hence while critical of the dominance of the reformist position 
we are not rejecting the role of planned intervention outright, but arguing for 
locating it within fuller and more honest political economy analysis: sensitive to 
diverse contexts and to the interaction between ways of thinking about and doing 
development at global, national and sub-national levels (Gaventa, 2006).  No 
universal framework for PEA can ever realistically encapsulate such complexity; but 
that is an argument for more political economy analysis of aid effectiveness rather 
than less, including more empirical research into the use of PEA itself.  
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